After the bill was passed, he gave a speech in the House of Commons in which he said that if the Liberals wanted to pass a bill on internal self-government, they would have to present it to voters by calling a general election. His accession to the leadership of the Conservative Party provided him with a platform to express his opinion to the public, and his speeches (culminating in the speech at the Royal Albert Hall in January 1912) focused as much on internal self-government as on customs reform. [85] Unlike Balfour`s opposition to internal autonomy, Law presented a “fire and blood” opposition to internal autonomy, which sometimes seemed to indicate that he was prepared to consider civil war to stop internal autonomy. [86] The law stated that it “would not deter any action. We consider it necessary to defeat one of the most unworthy conspiracies. was never formed against the freedoms of men born free. [86] Since the Conservative Party was sharply divided by the tariff issue, Law decided to make opposition to self-government the best way to unite the Conservative Party as its trademark. [86] From the beginning, Law presented his anti-home rule position more in terms of protecting Ulster`s Protestant majority from the rule of a Catholic-dominated parliament in Dublin than in terms of preserving the Union, much to the chagrin of many unionists. [86] By the age of thirty, Law had established himself as a successful businessman and had had time to devote himself to quieter activities.
He remained an avid chess player, whom Andrew Harley called “a strong player who touched the first-class amateur level he had reached by training at Glasgow Club in the early days”. [17] Law also worked with the Parliamentary Debating Association and registered golf, tennis and walking. In 1888 he left the Kidston house and opened his own house in Seabank, with his sister Mary (who had previously come from Canada) as a housekeeper.[18] [Citation needed] For Bonar Law, Ireland`s policy of autonomy is positive. The Liberals pursued it only because they depended on Irish nationalist support in the House of Commons; and the results for the Protestants of Ulster would be catastrophic. Moreover, there was no constitutional way for the Conservatives to block the measure after the Parliament Act lifted the absolute veto of the House of Lords. This was an issue on which Law was remarkably strongly felt. He insisted that once the Lords` veto is lifted, Royal Consent to a Bill should no longer be a formality. But in the final analysis, he was ready to approve the use of force. At Blenheim in July 1912 he declared that he could “not imagine a period of resistance to which Ulster could go, in which I should not be prepared to support them,” and the following year he indicated that his party would press for the army to refuse to obey orders to implement self-government.
Previous interpretations have highlighted his weakness and inexperience, either his “complacency” toward Conservative party extremists or his willingness to seek compromise when the civil war began in the fall of 1913. Much of the responsibility for the political impasse from 1912 to 1914 is directly or implicitly attributed to the Bonar Act. But the Conservative leader was a more accomplished politician. He sought to use the crisis of autonomy not only to strengthen his own fragile leadership, but also to bring the Conservatives back to power. He proposed it by allowing the political system to reach an impasse on self-government by not helping the Liberals reach a compromise, while at the same time inciting Ulster to oppose the law of its implementation. This left Asquith, the Liberal prime minister, faced with the impossible choice of imposing the law on Ulster (which caused a civil war) or holding a general election when his government was perceived as unpopular. Bonar Law felt that Asquith preferred to hold an election, although Asquith was saved from such a decision by the outbreak of war. So it was a “high-risk” strategy to win a position for the party he led.
His role has not been an easy task. He had to convince conservative backbenchers to accept the leadership of the man who had been their main political enemy before the war. He himself had to work with this man. Usually, they met every morning for two hours, often Lloyd allowed George Bonar Law to submit his ideas for detailed examination. If they survived, he knew they could go through cabinet and the House of Commons. More importantly, Bonar Law, as chancellor, had to raise the funds to pay for the war. In 1917, he raised the huge sum of 600 million through a war credit campaign, and he overthrew his officials and the governor of the Bank of England by setting interest rates at 5% instead of 6%, thus ensuring significant savings for the nation. He borrowed huge sums of money, but in total he found 26% of the war spending from the tax, more than in any other belligerent country. H. Asquith, former Minister of the Interior and then Prime Minister.
[37] His speeches at the time were known for their clarity and common sense; Sir Ian Malcolm said he “made the people involved seem understandable”, and L.S. Amery said his arguments were “like hammering an experienced riveter, every blow that hits the nail on the head”. [37] Despite Law`s efforts to reach consensus among the Conservatives, Balfour was unable to keep both sides of his party together and resigned as premier in December 1905, allowing the Liberals to form a government. [37] Parliament rose for the summer recess on August 15, and Law and the Unionists spent the summer trying to convince the king to give an opinion on the matter.