Later, in each of these genera, we will have to examine the species and the number of their species and the objects to which they refer. This will lead us to reflect on the distinction within political (or simply just) law, not only between just natural justice and legal or conventional justice, but also between natural justice and legal justice – as habitual forms of political justice – and natural law and positive law – as explicit forms of political justice. In fact, the first conclusion we found at the beginning of the study was that what is right is an idea of the same name. Thus, among the various reasons that can be attributed to the just concept, we find the formal reason of the just – which is nothing but proportional equality, possessed as justice and finally expressed as law – the ultimate reason of the just – which is nothing other than the good exercised in just action – the actual reason – identified with the just man, embodied in the legislator or judge – and material reason, that is, the kind of goods and relations on which the just is based. Well, in the latter case, the reason for the just exists just as politically just, insofar as the just is really inserted into a thing, the political community, and in relation to certain goods the common or political goods265. What is currently the case is political only because of its theme. This distinction is particularly important because it in turn makes it possible to distinguish the natural from the legal or the conventional within the politically just. The reason for this distinction is as follows: the just natural as well as the just political is the just in general according to the reason of matter; Now that the material reason is the political community, the just Well, once political justice has been distinguished from what is not politically distinguished, internal justice, it is necessary to return to the distinction between the natural just and the just juridical. This distinction could be explained by the eponymous nature of the concept of political justice. Indeed, since politically just is nothing but only according to its material reason and only a homonymous term, politically just can only be homonymous in its material reason.
Since, on the other hand, it is possible to summarize the homonymy of the just into the just according to its formal and final consideration, the political just, which is homonymous in its material reason, will be mainly in terms of form and purpose. This distinction will, in fact, allow us to explain both meanings of political just: as legally just and as naturally just. In this sense, legal justice is nothing but just political according to its formal reason, while natural justice is just political according to its ultimate reason. This diversity of reasons, in turn, allows us to understand the legal as well as the political as established and the natural as the political as founders. Let`s see why. Just as in what it is in itself and in its ultimate principles and causes. This is essential, because it is only by logically disregarding what is right from its concrete matter that it can be considered not so much in what it really is – as a concrete and particular existence – but in the extent that it is said, that is, insofar as it is articulated and expressed in language as law and thus gives reason in all sorts of ways. We can therefore make explicit the characteristics common to any law, or only to the extent that it is said, insofar as what is right – or just as just – is not said in one way, but in many, but always according to these two main causes: form and end. In civil justice and political law, one can distinguish what is natural from what is purely legal. This is, of course, what has the same power everywhere and does not depend on the resolutions that people can grasp one way or the other.
The purely legal is anything that may initially be indifferent in this way or vice versa, but ceases to be indifferent since the law has resolved it: for example, the law states that the ransom of prisoners is a mine or that a goat is burned to Jupiter and not to a lamb. The same applies to all provisions relating to individuals; and the law may also order the victim of Brasidas{107}. In this case, in short, there is everything that is prescribed by special decrees. The domestic Just, as Aristotle says, is not really politically just, but only by similarity, inasmuch as the conditions of the relationship of justice in these cases are not free and equal subjects – independently of each other – but only in a certain way, then the relationship that binds them is common only in a certain way. In fact, while they all share the trait, let`s start with legal fairness. Legal justice is nothing but the politics or just of a particular political community expressed in law. Now, the preeminent manner in which political justice is expressed, as we know, is the general law or for its own sake, and its principal function is nothing other than to establish a social body as an organized political community. In this sense, legal justice is the express form of the measure in which it establishes a political order. To the extent that it is necessarily inscribed in a matter – the social body – to give it a certain form that organizes it into a political community, the legally just cause, like the matter that regulates, is mobile and variable: it changes from one community to another, since the matter on which it acts is different and therefore it also wants to adapt to matter.
and the relationship between one and the other in an organized political community. Therefore, juridical justice is the just who is inserted into a political community, inasmuch as it establishes a political order and as such is flexible and differs from a righteousness, if the political righteousness from which the above distinction derives is, in relation to the just in general, the just according to his material reason – that is, what exactly is considered of the place where it is exercised and the goods on which it rests, and in this sense of the justice of a political community, what is politically, according to Aristotle, not so much in relation to the just in general, but in itself? Aristotle answers nothing; It only distinguishes them negatively from what is not politically just, that is, from what is right domestically. The reason for this is, in our opinion, that, since the specific difference of the just politician is nothing but the material reason of the same – the political community – it is only possible to distinguish the just politics from what happens in a political community, it is not given by the relation to the political community: the just domestic (only dominant, paternal side, and others similar)269. This way of offering sacrifices in honor of Brasidas and provisions of the nature of the decrees”268. This Aristotelian distinction, as we see, completely separates it from the classical interpretation of natural law that seventeenth-century classical iusnaturalism makes of the Scottish and Suarist matrix. To the extent that they develop in the polis and there is somehow a relationship between their concepts, the truth is that, in political equity, each of the subjects of the relationship is absolutely different from the other, whereas in these cases only one of them seems to be absolute – the father, the husband and the master. the other is one of them. Now, regardless of whether this participation is greater or smaller, resembling more or less absolute or political justice – the relationship between the spouses is closer to political justice than that of the servant with the master and that of the son with the father – 270 – the truth is that, although in these cases, the perfect reason for the righteous is not given, inasmuch as both are not free and equal men, they are in some way righteous relations with the absolutely just, for if the son and servant of the Father and the Lord are, and inasmuch as the perfect reason for the righteous is not given, they are all men, and as such something that exists in itself, which means that, on the one hand, these relations are somehow just and, on the other hand, as men, are fully legal subjects in the political situation. Having analyzed what is generally right, it is now a question of seeing it in the city and the distinctions it generates.264 Description of the paperback. Condition: New. Language: Spanish. Brand new book.
In a famous passage from Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes the distinction between what is intrinsically right and what justice depends on the law. It is an important text that has rightly attracted the attention of commentators on ethics, from Michael of Ephesus in Byzantium and from Averroes to Cordoba to authors who studied in thirteenth-century Europe – when they were able to know this work thanks to its translation into Latin -: Alberto Magno, Tomás de Aquino, Radulfo Brito, Walter Burley, Geraldus Odonis, Johannes Buridan, Nicolás Oresme and Pedro de Osma. This book examines the history of the reception of the doctrine of natural justice among medieval commentators on ethics.